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Against the background of a global focus on base erosion and profit shifting and well-publicised cases of high profile 
multinationals minimising their taxable burden in high tax jurisdictions, including the use of transfer pricing as a major tax 
minimisation strategy, this paper argues for a reconceptualisation of Australia’s Transfer Pricing rules by adopting an 
approach based on using economic presence as a basis for source based taxation. 
The approach of the paper is to first discuss and evaluate the evolution of Australia’s transfer pricing legislation.  In this part, 
it will be argued that the most current reforms to Australia’s transfer pricing regime present several fundamental deficiencies.  
In response to these deficiencies, the second part of the paper advocates a policy response focused on a reconceptualised 
version of current source rules applying economic presence as a foundation for taxation. 
 
  
                                                          
1 Lecturer, Curtin Law School. 
2 Professor of Taxation Law, Curtin Law School and Fellow, Tax Law and Policy Research Institute, 
Monash University. 
***This paper was submitted for publication on 28/7/2014 and accepted for publication on 27 November 
2014.  Materials are current as of the date this article was submitted for publication. 
 
 





Transfer pricing occurs when goods and/or services are sold or purchased between 
entities that are located in different countries, but which are members of the same 
multinational group.
3 
 The price allocated to such goods and/or services can materially 
impact upon the profitability of entities within the group and therefore can ultimately 
determine the amount of tax they pay.
4
 
Tax benefits associated with base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) have featured 
prominently worldwide
5
 including examples of high profile multinationals, such as 
Apple, Starbucks, Microsoft, Google and Amazon
6
 minimising their taxable burden in 
high tax jurisdictions through complex international structures,
7
 including the use of 
transfer pricing as a major tax minimisation strategy.
8
 
This focus on reforming transfer pricing and targeting BEPS has been occurring 
internationally, with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) releasing its discussion paper, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
and subsequent Action Plan, as part of its BEPS project.
9
  Furthermore, the G8,10 
G20
11 
and the OECD have agreed to undertake substantive action to curtail problems 
associated with BEPS, including those caused by transfer pricing. 
At the same time as these international developments have been unfolding, several 
countries, including Australia, have taken active steps to reform and revisit their 
domestic transfer pricing rules.12
 
                                                          
3 Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), Bills Digest to Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax 




5 See, for example, Richard Gluyas, ‘Call for Law Reform to Close Tax Loopholes’, The Australian, 10 
March 2014, 19.; Michael Bingemann and Andrew Main, ‘Billions in Revenue 36 million in tax: It’s 
the Apple Way’, The Weekend Australian, 1–2 February 2014, 25, Dipesh Gadher and Simon Duke, 
‘British Hit Google with $4 Million Tax Bill’, The Australian, 6 January 2014, 5; Katie Walsh ‘Labor 
Targets Digital Giants for Tax’, Australian Financial Review, 22 November 2012, 1.  Former Assistant 
Treasurer Hon. David Bradbury MP, ‘Towards a Fair Competitive and Sustainable Corporate Tax 
Base’, (Speech delivered at the ICAA National Tax Conference, Hilton Sydney, 22 November 2012)
 <http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/2012/013.htm&pageID=005
&min=djba&Year=&DocType>.  Note since the date this article was originally submitted and accepted 
for publication there has been a substantial number of articles dealing with this issue. 
6 See as examples the references provided in n 5. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Richard Vann, “Tax Base Erosion—What is likely to be the Australian Legislative Response Going 
Forward?” (Paper presented at the Corporate Tax Masterclass NSW Division of Taxation Institute, 23 
October 2013) states at p. 3 that, “there has been an increasing crescendo in the press about the tax 
planning of multinational in the digital economy which has captured attention round the world”. 
9 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2013), (OECD BEPS 
Report), 10, 52, 53.  Action Items 8, 9 and 10 deal with transfer pricing.  The deadline for examination 
of these issues is September 2015.  Action Item 13 deals with transfer pricing documentation.  The 
most recent Federal Budget has adopted the recommendations in relation to Action Item 13 (see below). 
10 Group of 8 industrialised countries. 
11 Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. 
12 Examples of some countries other than Australia that have revised there transfer pricing rules include 
most recently Greece, Ukraine, Mexico, Costa Rica and Nigeria. 
 
 




The catalyst for Australia’s reforms in this area has been three-fold.13 
First, in Australia the significance of transfer pricing arrangements as a percentage of 
GDP has been increasing and was estimated to be over 20% of Australia’s GDP in 
2009.
14  
 This appears to be, at least in part, a direct consequence of growing 
globalisation
15
 which has led to increased mobility of capital and has allowed 
companies to incorporate in different jurisdictions with increasing ease.
16
 
Next, the decisions delivered in Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd
17
 
and Roche Products Pty Ltd v FCT
18
 were contrary to the Australian Taxation Office’s 
(ATO) views in relation to the application of the transfer pricing provisions and were 
seen as highlighting a perceived deficiency in the rules. 
Finally, the worldwide focus on reforming transfer pricing to address BEPS strategies 
has also given further impetus to countries like Australia to review the efficacy of their 
domestic transfer pricing rules. 
The response to these drivers has resulted in a three-phased reform process in 
Australia. 
Currently, Australia’s transfer pricing rules are contained in two sources, namely the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (ITAA 1997) and the associated enterprise 
                                                          
13 In July 2010, the OECD updated the report, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administration.  All the member countries accepted the concept on 1 November 2011 and the 
Australian Government announced it would modernise the existing transfer pricing rules to further 
align them with international best practice. 
14 Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), above n 3. The Digest states at p. 7: “Any set of 
transactions representing over 20 percent of Australia’s gross domestic product is a sizeable piece of its 
economic activity. It would concern any government that the expected revenue arising from such 
activity was not collected”. 
15 OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms, <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1121>.  Notably, 
former UN secretary Kofi Anan stated that, “It has been said that arguing against globalization is like 
arguing against the law of gravity”.  The OECD defines globalisation as: 
an increasing internationalisation of markets for goods and services, the means of production, financial 
systems, competition, corporations, technology and industries.  Among other things this gives rise to 
increased mobility of capital, faster propagation of technological innovations and an increasing 
interdependency and uniformity of national markets. 
16 Inspector General of Taxation, Report into the ATO’s Management of Transfer Pricing Matters (IGOT 
TP Report) (released June 2014), http://igt.gov.au/files/2014/11/management-of-transfer-pricing-
matters.pdf .  In the IGOT TP Report stated at p. 1: 
1.4 Most submissions impressed on the IGT that the above issues have been exacerbated by 
major changes in the global business environment over the past two decades such as: 
 ongoing evolution of globalisation leading to the decline of trade barriers and increasing the 
privatisation of business activity, which is said to have facilitated the expansion of many 
businesses globally and increased the importance of transfer pricing policies; 
 ongoing (re)location of the production of final products and components to various 
jurisdictions to improve business efficiency with decisions based on production costs, 
infrastructure, tax incentives and skilled labour force; 
 the concentration of service functions and assets, such as research and development, 
internal finance, production and intangible assets within different business units of a Multi-
National Enterprise (MNE) which may be located in different jurisdictions; and 
 advances in telecommunications that has allowed, among other things, the advent of 
electronic commerce and ‘24/7’ trading. 
17 [2011] FCAFC 74. 
18 [2008] AATA 639. 
 
 




articles of Australia’s Double Tax Agreements (DTAs) in the International Tax 
Agreements Act 1953 (Cth).
19
 
In order to get to the current legislative framework, Australia’s domestic transfer 
pricing regime has undergone a significant three-phase transformation.  Phase One 
consisted of former Division 13 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA 
1936).  Division 13 applied from 1982 but was repealed on 29 June 2013 and replaced 
by the current transfer pricing regime. 
The second phase involved the enactment of former Division 815-A of the ITA 1997.  
These rules were introduced from 2012 and were controversially enacted 
retrospectively to deal with perceived deficiencies in existing Division 13, which 
applied from 2004 onwards.  Division 815-A only applied if there was a DTA in force 
and was designed to ensure that the DTA functioned as an independent head of power.  
Where no DTA was in force, Division 13 continued to apply. 
The third and current phase involved the termination of Division 13 and Subdivision 
815-A for income years on or after 29 June 2013 and the replacement of new transfer 
pricing rules in Subdivision 815-B, 815-C, 815-D of the ITAA 1997 and 284-E of the 
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (TAA 1953).
20
 
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is twofold.  Firstly, the paper 
discusses the evolution of Australia’s transfer pricing legislation and evaluates the 
regime, over the three phases of its reform.
21
  It will be argued that the most current 
reforms to Australia’s transfer pricing regime present several fundamental deficiencies 
and rather than overcoming the difficulties recently noted by the OECD in its BEPS 
report, they actually legislatively entrench those difficulties. 
In response to these deficiencies the second part of this paper advocates a 
reconceptualised version of current source rules as a possible policy response.  It is 
contended that current source rules have an established theoretical justification and 
policy underpinnings to address the limitations of the current transfer pricing regime 
and also have sufficient flexibility to remain relevant in the modern economy.  While 
it is beyond the scope of this paper to address the logistics of translating this solution 
into legislation, it will be argued that the strong theoretical justifications for adopting 
the source rules to allocate jurisdiction to tax in transfer pricing transactions warrants 
further consideration. 
It is recognised that there are other potential legislative solutions, such as a formulary 
approach or greater reliance on the recently amended general anti- avoidance rule 
(GAAR) contained in Part IVA of the ITAA 1936.  However, the limitations 
associated with adopting a formulary approach for transfer pricing has been debated in 
                                                          
19 Australia has over 40 DTAs with other countries.  For a list of countries with which Australia has a 
DTA see, http://www.treasury.gov.au/Policy-Topics/Taxation/Tax-Treaties/HTML/Income-Tax-
Treaties. 
20 These rules were enacted by the Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and Multinational 
Profit Shifting) Act 2013 (Cth).  Enacted as Act 101 of 2013. 
21 Note that in parallel to these transfer pricing reforms other significant reforms have been occurring in 
the international tax landscape in Australia.  These include the proposal to require the Commissioner to 
publish the tax information of large corporates.  The introduction of the International Dealing Schedule 
and Reportable Tax Position Schedule which requires increased disclosure of reportable tax positions 
and international dealings. 
 
 




the literature and currently most jurisdictions do not seem to have a ready appetite to 
adopt such an approach.
22
  Furthermore, the limitations associated with the use of a 




By contrast, the idea of a return to relying on source rules as a conceptual basis for 
allocating the right to tax income in related party transactions has not received 
significant recent consideration by the literature, especially in the context of transfer 
pricing, and therefore warrants further consideration. 
This paper is based on the assumption that protection of the corporate income tax base 
is a justifiable policy goal.  It is acknowledged that other commentators and reports 
have suggested that instead of constantly reforming the corporate income tax base 
there should be greater emphasis on looking for other more robust and efficient taxes 
such as a consumption taxes.
24
  However, a discussion of this issue is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: 
 Part two considers the purpose of transfer pricing regimes; 
 Part three traces the three phases of Australia’s transfer pricing legislation and 
outlines areas of future action; 
 Part four details some of the major benefits and difficulties associated with the 
current Australian transfer pricing legislation; 
 Part five argues that a reconceptualisation of existing source rules using 
economic presence as a basis for taxation could provide an alternative 
response to addressing cross-border profit shifting that warrants further 
investigation; and 
 Part six concludes. 
                                                          
22 See, for example, Erik Roder, ‘Proposal for an Enhanced CCTB as Alternative to a CCTB with 
Formulary Apportionment’ (Working Paper, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 
2012).  Also see Arthur J Cockfield, ‘Formulary Taxation Versus the Arm’s Length Principle: The 
Battle Among Doubting Thomases, Purists and Pragmatists’ (2004) 52(1) Canadian Tax Journal, 114. 
23 See, for example, Rachel Tooma, Legislating Against Tax Avoidance (IBFD, 2008) which considers the 
advantages and disadvantages of utilising a GAAR to combat tax avoidance.  Given the similarity of 
the GAAR to the current transfer pricing provisions in Australia which also require ascertainment of a 
counter factual, this alternative has not been investigated in any detail. 
24 Vann, above n 8, 9 states: 
The main objective of the whole BEPS exercise is the protection and restoration of the 
international corporate income tax base, which is assumed to be such a policy no-brainer that 
there is little OECD argument for it.  Yet the OECD has for over two decades sponsored 
economic research indicating that the corporate income tax is inefficient (particularly because 
of the mobility of capital) and should be replaced by more efficient taxes, such as indirect 
taxes.  The Henry Review picked up on this work which is now regularly referred to in 
Treasury policy documents. 
 
 




2. PURPOSE OF TRANSFER PRICING REGIMES 
Transfer pricing rules are integrity measures designed to ensure that a taxing 
jurisdiction retains taxing rights over an appropriate return for the Australian 
operations of a business.  In the Australian context, the stated objective of the current 
transfer pricing rules suggests that these measures are designed to ensure that the tax 




An appropriate return is generally defined by what is considered to be ‘arm’s length’.  
This is the accepted basis for regulation by Australia and other OECD members.
26
 
Transfer pricing rules are pivotal in Australia, with related party transactions being 
valued at $270 billion in 2009.
27
  Likewise, the 2012/2013 ATO Compliance Program 
suggests that international related party transactions now comprise approximately 50% 
of all cross-border trade.
28 
 Furthermore, Treasury reports that intra-firm trade was 




It is expected that the scope and effect of transfer pricing will intensify as the world 
continues to be increasingly globalised and also as a greater trade occurs in services 
and in intangibles through the agency of related developments in e-commerce and 
advances in information and communication technologies.
30
 
2.1 Transfer pricing strategies 
While transfer pricing strategies can take various forms, at their most basic level they 
represent an attempt to shift profits from high tax to low tax jurisdictions by 
artificially inflating the costs of goods or services between related entities. This 
shifting can provide the group of companies with a tax benefit or advantage. In this 
respect, the ATO 2012/2013 Compliance Program suggests: 
Multinational groups may attempt to structure their global operations to 
minimise tax costs by, for example, maximising the proportion of their 
profits recorded in low-tax jurisdictions such as Singapore and Hong Kong.  
Our concern is with related-party dealings that are contrived to avoid paying 
a fair share of tax on profits earned in Australia.
31
 
Two very basic transfer pricing strategies are described below. 
                                                          
25 See the Objects sections in Subdivision 815-B in the form of section 815-105.  Also see paragraph 3.1 
to the Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and 
Multinational Profit Shifting) Bill 2013. 
26 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD 
Publishing, Paris, 2010). 
27 See paragraph 1.8 of the Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Cross Border Transfer 
Pricing) Bill (No 1) 2012. 
28 Australian Tax Office (ATO), Compliance Program 2012/2013. 
29 Commonwealth Treasury, Income tax: Cross border Profit Allocation: Review of Transfer Pricing 
Rules (Consultation Paper, November 2011). 
30 IGOT TP Report, above n 16. 
31 ATO, Compliance Program 2012/2013. 
 
 




The first strategy involves a company selling goods or services in a high tax 
jurisdiction (for example, Australia) at a low price to a related company in a low tax 
jurisdiction and the company in the low tax jurisdiction on-selling them to a third 
party purchaser.  This enables the profits to be shifted to the low tax jurisdiction and 
the profits booked in the high tax jurisdiction (for example, Australia) to be minimised. 
This is depicted in the diagram below. 
Figure 1: Basic transfer pricing strategy 1 
 
  Selling goods at a low price to a low tax jurisdiction that on-sells those goods at market value. 
 
The second strategy involves a company in a low tax jurisdiction selling goods or 
services to a company in a high tax jurisdiction at a high price, thereby shifting profits 
to the low tax jurisdiction, as the low tax company’s profits will be maximised thereby 
minimising the company’s overall tax liability.  The company can then on-sell those 
goods at market value to the ultimate purchaser.  A common example of this 
arrangement is depicted in the diagram below. 
  
• Australian  
Company 
Sells  goods at a low price to Low 
Tax  Company 
Shifts profits to a low tax 
jurisdiction 
• Low Tax 
Company 
Sells  goods to a purchaser at 
market value  therefore most 
of the profits are derived in a 










Figure 2: Basic transfer pricing strategy 2 
 
 Low tax jurisdiction sells goods at a high price to a high tax jurisdiction that on-sells those 
goods at market value, thereby shifting profits to the low tax jurisdiction. 
 
The well-publicised activities of Starbucks are a good example of the way transfer 
pricing strategies can be utilised.  Despite appearing to be a very commercially 
successful company Starbucks reported losses for a sustained period (a substantial 
proportion of the history of its operations) in the UK.
32
  Thus, there was a significant 
disconnect between this position for taxation purposes and the reports presented to 
shareholders that the business was successful.  To a large degree these losses were due 
to a substantial payment made to a Netherlands subsidiary for intellectual property and 
for payments relating to its coffee making activities.
33 
 In relation to Starbucks and the 
low quantum of company tax collected, the House of Commons, Public Accounts 
Committee, HM Revenue and Customs Annual Report and Accounts made the 
following observation: 
Starbucks told us that it has made a loss for 14 of the 15 years it has been 
operating in the UK, but in 2006 it made a small profit.  We found it difficult 
to believe that a commercial company with a 31% market share by turnover, 
with a responsibility to its shareholders and investors to make a decent return, 
was trading with apparent losses for nearly every year of its operation in the 
UK.  This was inconsistent with claims the company was making in 
briefings to its shareholders that the UK business was successful and it was 
making 15% profits in the UK.  Starbucks was not prepared to breakdown 
the 4.7% payment for intellectual property (which was 6% until recently) 
that the UK company pays to the Netherlands based company.  The 
Committee was sceptical that the 20% mark-up that the Netherlands based 
company pays to the Swiss based company on its coffee buying operations, 
                                                          
32 This was for 14 out of the 15 years Starbucks was in the UK. 
33 Public Accounts Committee, HM Revenue and Customs: Annual Report and Accounts, Tax Avoidance 
by Multinational Companies, House of Commons, United Kingdom, 3 December 2012. 
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with a further mark up before it sells to the UK, is reasonable.  Starbucks 
agreed that it had a special tax arrangement with the Netherlands that made it 
attractive to locate business there, which the Dutch authorities asked 
Starbucks to hold in confidence, and that Switzerland offers a very 
competitive tax rate.  In addition, there is an inter-company loan between the 
US Starbucks business and the UK Starbucks business over a period of time 
with the interest rate set at higher rate than any similar loan we have seen.  
We suspect that all these arrangements are devices to remove profits from 
the UK to these areas with lower tax.
34
 
In order to combat activities like this, governments worldwide have enacted and 
reviewed their transfer pricing legislation.  Australia’s protracted legislative history in 
this area is described below. 
3. THREE-PHASED REFORM OF AUSTRALIA’S TRANSFER PRICING REGIME 
3.1 Phase One: Former Division 13 
Former Division 13 of the ITAA 1936 applied into two situations, where there was: 
the supply or acquisition of ‘property’
35
 or services pursuant to an 
‘international agreement’
36 
between separate legal entities; or 
dealings internationally between a multinational head office and branch or 
permanent establishment (PE). 
Once the existence of these circumstances or preconditions was ascertained, the 
Commissioner could exercise his discretion to determine that the parties were not 
acting at arm’s length and had therefore received a transfer pricing benefit.
37 
 Where 
such a determination was made, the Commissioner could notionally substitute arm’s 
length consideration for the supply or acquisition.
  Hence, this provision focused on 
the Commissioner ascertaining what the arm’s length consideration was for a 
supply/receipt of property and services under an international agreement.38 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Property was defined expansively in former section 136AA to include: 
(a) a chose in action; 
(b) any estate, interest, right or power, whether at law or in equity, in or over property; 
(c) any right to receive income; and 
(d) services. 
36 An international agreement was defined in former section 136AC to be an agreement pursuant to which: 
  (a) a non-resident supplied or acquired property under the agreement otherwise than in connection 
with a business carried on in Australia by the non-resident at or through a permanent establishment of 
the non-resident in Australia; or 
 (b) a resident carrying on a business outside Australia supplied or acquired property under the 
agreement, being property supplied or acquired in connection with that business. 
37 Former section 136AD(1) to (3) of the ITAA 1936. 
38 Former section 136AD(4) operated where the Commissioner was unable to ascertain arm’s length 








Notably, where the Commissioner couldn’t practically ascertain an arm’s length 
consideration he could deem an arm’s length amount.  Likewise, where adjustments 
were made to a taxpayer’s taxable affairs pursuant to former section 136AD the 
Commissioner could provide for a compensating adjustment.39 
Like Part IVA of the ITAA 1936, former Division 13 had overriding operation over 
the other provisions of the Act, but not the provisions of the International Agreements 
Act 1953 (Cth) which continued to have effect.  However, it was subsequently made 
subject to Division 815-A of the ITAA 1997 which is discussed in further detail below. 
Under former section 170(9B) of the ITAA 1936,
40 
the Commissioner could amend an 
assessment to give effect to a transfer pricing determination at any time.
41 
Notably, the onus was on the taxpayer to disprove the Commissioner’s assessment
42
 
and therefore the taxpayer had to prove what the arm’s length consideration would be. 
While the core of former Division 13 was the determination of arm’s length price, 
there was nothing specific in the terms of former Division 13 that specified how to 
determine an arm’s length price. 
Australia and other OECD countries have adopted accepted methodologies in the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (2010) (OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines) to determine what is 
meant by arm’s length in this context.  Broadly these methodologies can be 
categorised into two types: traditional transaction methods and the profits methods.  
Under these two umbrella terms there are different methods that can be applied. A 
brief discussion of these methods is provided below. 
3.1.1 How to determine arm’s length price 
i. Traditional transaction methods 
There are three broad traditional transaction methods the comparable 
uncontrolled price method (CUP), the resale price method (RPM) and the cost 
plus method (CPM). 
The CUP is the most direct comparator.  Under this method a comparable 
transaction between unrelated parties in a comparable market is identified and 
the price is then set in the controlled transaction by reference to this.  
Difficulties in utilising this method result where there is no direct comparison 
or in cases which involve intangibles where such comparators may not be 
readily available. 
The RPM is based on the price that a product purchased from an associated 
enterprise is sold to an independent enterprise or third party.  The resale price 
is then reduced by the resale price margin and what remains is supposed to 
                                                          
39 Former section 136AF of the ITAA 1936. 
40 Repealed by Act 101 of 2013. 
41 ATO, Income tax assessments for the 2003–04 and Earlier Nil Years: Effect of Transfer Pricing 
Determination on the Period Within Which an Original Assessment Can Be Made, ID 2012/44, 
<http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?docid=%22AID%2FAID201244%2F00001%22>.  
42 WR Carpenter Holdings Pty Ltd v FCT [2007] FCAFC 103. 
 
 




represent an arm’s length price.  This method is most accurate where the party 
reselling the product does not add substantial value to the good.  The difficulty 
with this method lies in determining what an appropriate mark-up is and 
finding a comparable arm’s length re-seller. 
The CPM refers to profit mark up to suppliers cost (the same supplier in a 
comparable dealing with an independent party).  This requires an assessment 
to be made of what should be added to the suppliers cost to make arm’s length 
consideration (for example, what is the mark up).  This can be found by 
looking at a supplier in a comparable dealing with an independent party.  This 
method is accurate where semi-finished goods are sold between related parties. 
ii. The profit methods 
There are two types of profit methods: the profit split method (PSM) and the 
transactional net margin method (TNMM). 
The profit split method identifies the combined profit or loss from dealings 
between associated enterprises and then splits the profit on a basis which 
represents the division of profits which would flow from an arm’s length 
agreement.  Accordingly, the first step is to identify what is the quantum of the 
profit that should be split and the second is to split these profits on an 
economic basis. 
Under the TNMM, the net profit is examined in light of a base comprising of 
costs of sales and assets and then profits are attributed on a basis similar to the 
CPM and RPM. 
3.1.2 Double tax agreements and the OECD Guidelines 
In phase one a further source of transfer pricing/profit allocation rules were found in 
the associated enterprise articles of Australia’s DTAs and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines.  While the specific articles can differ, broadly such rules allow related-
party transactions to be scrutinised and to hypothesise the position if the entities had 
been dealing on an ‘independent basis’.
43
 
                                                          
43 For examples of associated enterprise articles see the Australian/Malaysian DTA Article 9 which states: 
 1. Where— 
 (a) an enterprise of one of the Contracting States participates directly or indirectly in the management, 
control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State; or 
 (b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an 
enterprise of one of the Contracting States and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either 
case conditions operate between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which 
differ from those which might be expected to operate between independent enterprises dealing at arm’s 
length, then any income or profits which, but for those conditions, might have been expected to accrue 
to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in 
the income or profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. 
2. If the information available to the competent authority of a Contracting State is inadequate to 
determine the income or profits to be attributed to an enterprise, nothing in this Article shall affect the 
application of any law of that State relating to the determination of the tax liability of a person by the 
exercise of a discretion or the making of an estimate by the competent authority, provided that that law 
shall be applied, so far as the information available to the competent authority permits, in accordance 
with the principles of this Article. 
 
 




3.1.3 The demise of Phase One—the SNF and Roche decisions 






The Roche decision was the first to test the transfer pricing regime in Australia.  The 
ATO audited Roche (a multinational pharmaceutical company) for the years 1993–
2003 and issued assessments totalling $126 million.  Ultimately this was reduced to 
$45 million. 
The taxpayer was a subsidiary of a Swiss holding company and carried on a business 
selling and supplying prescription and over-the-counter pharmaceuticals and other 
pharmaceutical products. 
The taxpayer had three divisions—pharmaceutical, consumer and diagnostic.  The 
Roche Group would sell through its subsidiaries and Roche agreed these sales were 
not at arm’s length. 
As a result of an audit, the ATO increased the taxpayer’s assessable income, alleging 
amounts paid were more than the arm’s length price.  The ATO made this adjustment 
on the basis of former section 136AD in Division 13
46
 and Article 9 of the 
Australia/Switzerland DTA.  One of the main basis for the adjustment was external 
reports prepared by American expert witnesses. 
Broadly, the ATO used the TNMM method.  The Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(AAT) substituted its own view on the arm’s length consideration, stating that the 
traditional transactional methods were preferable.  The AAT preferred the use of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines on transfer pricing and the CUP, RPM and CPM. 
The transfer pricing regime was again under the spotlight in SNF.
47
  SNF was a 
distributor of chemical products and a wholly-owned distributor of chemical products.  
The ATO undertook a transfer pricing audit and the ATO adopted the TNMM to 
estimate the arm’s length prices.  The basis for making these adjustments were said to 
be Article 9 of the US/Australian DTA, Article 9 of the Chinese/Australian DTA and 
Article 8 of the French/Australian DTA.  As a result of these articles the ATO 
increased the assessable income of SNF by approximately $13 million.  Specifically, 
the ATO stated: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3. Where profits on which an enterprise of one of the Contracting States has been charged to tax in that 
State are also included, by virtue of the provisions of paragraph 1 or 2, in the profits of an enterprise of 
the other Contracting State and charged to tax in that other State, and the profits so included are profits 
which might reasonably have been expected to have accrued to that enterprise of the other State if the 
conditions operative between the enterprises had been those which might reasonably have been 
expected to have operated between independent enterprises dealing wholly independently with one 
another, then the firstmentioned State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of tax 
charged on those profits in the firstmentioned State. In determining such an adjustment, due regard 
shall be had to the other provisions of this Agreement and for this purpose the competent authorities of 
the Contracting States shall if necessary consult each other. 
44 2008 AATA 639. 
45 [2011] FCAFC 74. 
46 Repealed by Act 101 of 2013. 
47 [2011] FCAFC 74. 
 
 




when a business is faced with persistent losses it would not have continued 
to purchase products from an arm’s length supplier at a price that led to the 
perpetuation of those losses.48 
The ATO lost this case on appeal to the Full Federal Court where it was held that 
prices paid by the taxpayer were on an arm’s length basis and the CUP method was an 
acceptable estimation of arm’s length price and therefore, the Commissioner’s 
adjustment on the basis of TNMM were not valid.  The Court held that the fact that 
there were sustained losses did not invalidate the taxpayer’s case and significantly the 
Court stated that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines were of limited assistance in 
interpreting Division 13. 
Following this case, commentators argued that there was uncertainty in relation to the 
following: 
 Whether Australia’s DTAs could indeed act as a sword and not a 
shield, that is, could DTAs be a repository of taxing powers?; 
 What role profit-based calculations of arm’s length could play in 
reallocating transfer prices; and 
 The Commissioner’s power to reconstruct or annihilate the transaction 




3.2 Phase Two—former Subdivision 815-A 
Former Subdivision 815-A of the ITAA 1997 was enacted in September 2012 and 
applied retrospectively from 1 July 2004.
50
  It was designed to boost the efficacy of 
Australia’s DTA rules and was specifically created to ensure that the domestic rules in 
Australia were interpreted consistently with ‘international transfer pricing standards’ 
as enunciated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
51
 
More specifically it was enacted in response to the Roche and SNF
52
 decisions 
(discussed above) as the government perceived these cases highlighted issues with the 
existing Australian transfer pricing provisions.
53
 
The stated purpose of Subdivision 815-A was to limit taxable profits being redirected 
outside Australia and one way the government sought to achieve this was by providing 
                                                          
48 Ibid. 
49 Significant literature exists discussing these points as examples see comments made in the following 
papers: Bob Deutsch, ‘International Tax Hot Topics’ (Paper presented at 28th National Convention, 
Tax Institute, Perth Convention and Exhibition Centre, 13-15 March 2013); Janelle Sadri, ‘Responding 
to Australia’s Transfer Pricing Reforms’ (Paper presented on International Day, Tax Institute City West, 
West Perth, 10 May 2013); Soulla McFall, Marc Simpson and Leesan McLeish, ‘Transfer Pricing 
Reforms in Australia’ (2012) 46(8) Taxation in Australia, 357. 
50 Tax Laws Amendment (Cross-Border Transfer Pricing) Act (No. 1) 2012 (Cth). 
51 Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Cross Border Transfer Pricing) Bill (No 1) 2012. 
52 [2011] FCAFC 74. 
53 The Hon Bill Shorten MP (then Assistant Treasurer), ‘Robust Transfer Pricing Rules for 









reference to the OECD guidance material, to enable interpretation of the rules.
54
  It 
further provided clarification of how this worked in conjunction with Division 820 of 
the ITAA 1997 in relation to the thin capitalisation rules.  As discussed, these 
guidelines were held not to be a legitimate aid to the construction of the DTAs or 
Division 13 in SNF and Roche and this change was directed at seeking to overcome 
these difficulties by allowing a transfer pricing adjustment to be made under 
Subdivision 815-A, relevant provisions of a DTA or Division 13.  Specifically, the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Act stated that: 
The decision of SNF highlighted that Division 13 may not adequately reflect 
the contributions of the Australian operations to multinational groups and as 




Subdivision 815-A allowed the Commissioner to determine a liability under the 
domestic law rather than the DTA to negate a transfer pricing benefit.  The 
Commissioner could negate the transfer pricing benefit and increase the taxable 
income or reduce the loss or net capital loss of the entity.  No tax avoidance purpose 
was required and the associated enterprise or business profits articles of the DTA 
could apply.  However, overall this Division operated to allow the ATO to maintain 
the position that DTAs indeed did provide a separate power to make transfer pricing 
adjustments. 
Thus, Division 815-A ultimately created a situation where a DTA could act as a sword 
rather than a shield and it is arguable that this leads to a situation where DTAs are 
exceeding their intended purposes as the commonly understood purpose of a DTA is 
to allocate taxing rights in cases of possible double tax rather than to create taxing 
powers per se.  For example, in the case of Undershaft (No 1) Ltd v FCT
56 the Court 
stated that a ‘DTA does not give a Contracting State power to tax’ but rather allocates 
the right to tax between Contracting States in case of possible double taxation. 
Finally, there was an unlimited amendment period for determination by the 
Commissioner under Subdivision 815-A.
57
 
One of the major difficulties with Subdivision 815-A was that it applied only to cross-
border dealings with treaty countries and therefore this created a patchwork of 
inconsistent rules discriminating on the basis of whether a treaty was in place with the 
country where the related part was resident. 
3.3 The Final Phase - Subdivision 815-B to D of the ITAA 1997, Subdivision 284-E of 
Schedule 1 of the TAA 
Australia’s current transfer pricing regime is contained in Subdivision 815-B to D of 
the ITAA 1997 and Subdivision 284-E Schedule 1 of the TAA 1953. 
                                                          
54 Section 815-20(2) ITAA1997. 
55 Above n 51, paragraph 1.12. 
56 [2009] FCA 41. 
57 The transitional provisions apply to penalty imposition 2004/5–2011/12 income years. 
 
 




This new regime replaces the former two regimes and applies to income years 
commencing on or after 29 June 2013 and unlike previous section 815-A, it only 
operates prospectively. 
The regime as a whole is designed to create alignment between the application of the 
arm’s length principle in Australia’s domestic law and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines.  The stated aim of these provisions is to ensure that the taxable amount 
imposed reflects the economic contribution made by Australian operations.
58
  
Furthermore, the operation and drafting of these provisions are designed to put beyond 
any doubt that the Commissioner can have reference to the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and also to look at the “totality of the arrangements where taxpayer takes 
place instead of the particular circumstances of a specific set of transactions”.
59
 
Section 815-B requires amounts brought to tax in Australia where there are cross 
border transactions to be worked out by applying arm’s length conditions.
60
 
Section 815-120 states that a transfer pricing benefit can include an increase in taxable 
income or withholding tax amount, reduction in losses or tax offsets. 
Where this type of benefit is obtained, section 815-115 requires that arm’s length 
conditions are substituted in place of financial relations it may have with another 
entity.  Arm’s length conditions are those that would be expected to operate between 
independent entities in comparable circumstances. 
Section 815-125(2) provides significantly more flexibility in relation to the calculation 
of an arm’s length price by requiring the use of the ‘most appropriate and reliable 
method’ to calculate arm’s length conditions.  This is ascertained by having regard to 
a defined set of circumstances including the: 
 strengths and weaknesses of the method is in their application to the 
actual conditions; 
 circumstances such as the functions performed, assets used and risks 
that are taken by each of the entities; 
 availability of reliable information required to enable the use of a 
particular valuation method; 
 degree of comparability between the actual circumstances and the 
comparable circumstances. 
  
                                                          
58 Above n 25. 
59 Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), above n 3, 10. 
60 Section 815-105(1) ITAA 1997. 
 
 





Section 815-135 allows the use of documentation to identify arm’s length conditions 
including the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
The new rules specify an amendment period of seven years.61 
Subdivision 815-C also applies to transfer pricing benefits that arise for entities PE 
and is designed to ensure that the attribution of income and expenses between parts of 
an entity reflects the allocation that may be expected had the parts been separate 
entities dealing with each other on a ‘wholly independent’ basis.  The new rules are 
triggered where an entity that is a PE gets a tax advantage that it would not have 




Section 815-215 requires that if a PE gets a transfer pricing benefit it should disregard 
amounts of profit attributed to it and calculate the amounts on an arm’s length basis. 
Section 815-220 defines a tax benefit arising when the profit calculated on an arm’s 
length basis is different to the actual profit. 
Section 815-235 specifies that the arm’s length profits will be worked out in 
accordance with the OECD Model Tax Convention and commentaries as amended on 
22 July 2010. 
Subdivision 815-D sets out special rules that apply to trusts and partnerships 
attempting to ensure transfer pricing rules will apply to these entities. 
A significant feature of the new rules in relation to the new provision is that they are 
self-executing and are therefore no longer dependent on the discretion of the 
Commissioner making a determination arguably this approach brings the rules more 
into line with the self-assessment basis of Australia’s tax system. 
These rules operate in conjunction with Subdivision 284-E Schedule 1 of the TAA 
1953 which notes the documentation that an entity should retain in -assessing the tax 
position under Subdivision 815-B or 815-C. 
A de minimis threshold applies, and below that threshold penalties will not be incurred.  
To comply with the new rules, documentation must be prepared before lodgement of 
the relevant taxpayer’s return.  While the documentation requirements are not 
mandatory they are relevant for the taxpayer being able to establish that a reasonably 




One notable aspect is that this Subdivision will apply to all dealings between related 
and unrelated parties to ensure that the dealings are arm’s length and recreates the 
transactions so that they will be what they would have been if the entities were dealing 
on a ‘wholly independent basis’.  The reason for this broader casting of the net is to 
ensure that: 
                                                          
61 Section 815-150 ITAA 1997. 
62 Section 815-225 ITAA 1997. 
63 See also section 4.3.2 of this paper where this point is dealt with in detail. 
 
 




Independent parties engaging in, for example, collusive behaviour or other practices 
where they are not dealing exclusively in their own economic interests will not 
circumvent the rules by reason of their non-association.
64
 
3.4 Future reforms 
Despite the consolidation of Australia’s transfer pricing provisions described above, 
there are still substantial future reforms and activities taking place in this area. The 
OECD has released a draft booklet on moderating transfer pricing,
65
 a draft white 
paper on transfer pricing documentation
66  
and a Discussion Paper on the issues 
associated with intangibles in the transfer pricing context.
67
 The Commonwealth 
Treasury has released an Issues Paper in relation to dealing with multinational profits 
shifting.
68
  The ATO has established an anti-profit shifting taskforce.  The two key 
functions of the taskforce are to work with offshore tax authorities to investigate the 
substance of the operations of Australian multinational entities, offshore entities or 
associates and investigate profitable multinational companies (MNCs) doing business 
in Australia. 
In the 2015–16 Federal Budget, the Australian Government announced various 
measures to combat BEPS including: 
 The implementation of new transfer pricing documentation standards based on 
the OECDs recommendations.  These documentation requirements will 
provide information being provided on the global operations of large 




 A master file that contains a complete overview of the corporations global 
business, organisational structure and overarching transfer pricing policies;
70
 




 Developing a ‘targeted anti-avoidance law’ within Part IVA Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) to address multinationals that seek to ‘artificially 
                                                          
64 Above n 25. 
65 OECD BEPS Report, above n 9. 
66 OECD, White Paper on Transfer Pricing Documentation (OECD Publishing, Paris, 30 July 2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/white-paper-transfer-pricing-documentation.pdf.  This was 
developed in response to Action 13 in the OECD’s Action Plan which stated that there should be rules 
surrounding transfer pricing documentation.  It is stated that MNEs should provide governments with 
information on their global allocation of income, economic activity and taxes paid. 
67 This is a Revised Discussion Draft on the transfer pricing aspects of intangibles. 
68 The Commonwealth Treasury released a Scoping Paper Risks to the Sustainability of Australia’s 
Corporate Tax Base to look at the integrity issues associated with BEPS.  The Scoping Paper 
acknowledged the risk to Australia’s and the international community’s corporate tax bases and 
endorsed the OECD’s BEPS Report. 










avoid’ a taxable presence in Australia.  An associated measure will be 
doubling the penalties the Commissioner can apply to such corporates.
72
 
It is expected that the OECD’s BEPS project will make further recommendations in 
this area and continued focus on the efficacy of these rules is likely to persist and 
intensify. 
4. EVALUATION 
This section firstly sets out some base comparisons between the regimes detailed 
previously.  Utilising these comparisons, it then analyses the advantages and 
deficiencies of these changes. 
4.1 Comparisons 
The table below summarises the different outcomes for each of the three phases of 
Australia’s transfer pricing rules. 








Table 1:  Different outcomes for each of the three phases of Australia’s transfer 
pricing rules. 
 Phase One 
Division 13 of the  
ITAA 1936 
Relevant articles of 
Australia’s DTAs 
Phase Two 
815-A of the 
ITAA 1997 
Division 13 of the  ITAA 
1936 
Phase Three 
815-B, C, D 




Schedule 1 of 
the TAA 1953 
Feature of the 
transaction 
under scrutiny 
Pricing of transactions 
Arm’s length 
consideration 
Looking at economic 







or assessed by 
the 
Commissioner 
Assessed by the 
Commissioner but onus 




Assessed by the 
Commissioner but onus on 




by the taxpayer 
Documentation 
requirements 
No No Documentation 
284-E of 
Schedule 1 to 





170(9B) of the ITAA 
1936) 
Unlimited  7 years 
(section 815-
150 of the 
ITAA 1997) 
 
4.2 Advantages of the new regime 
4.2.1 Enhancing certainty, consistency and equity 
The policy goals of the new legislation as noted above appear to be robust and highly 
justifiable: to align Australia’s domestic measures with the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and to bolster the efficacy of Australia’s transfer pricing rules.  The 
importance of having effective integrity measures are well documented and the overall 
advantage is every multinational pays their ‘fair share’ of tax in the jurisdictions in 
which they have an economic presence.  This in turn creates greater equity for all 
Australian taxpayers.  As the former Assistant Treasurer David Bradbury stated these 
types of integrity measures ensure multinationals are unable to gain: 
 
 




an unfair competitive advantage over domestic companies and disadvantage 
Australian taxpayers who must make up the tax shortfall or accept fewer 
Government services.73 
Rather than representing a patchwork of legislative measures, the consolidation of the 
rules into a single regime appears to provide more coherence and certainty which is 
also desirable.  The integration of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines into the 
domestic tax rules also appears to create a more certain pathway for applying and 
incorporating these rules. 
The Taxation Institute stated in their submission on the (then) proposed transfer 
pricing amendments: 
cohesive and co-ordinated approach to transfer pricing between Australia 
and our major trading partners is essential to ensure that multi-national 
enterprises (MNEs) are broadly taxed in line with mutually agreed principles 
as encapsulated in the OECD Guidelines.  MNEs also stand to benefit via 
lower compliance costs stemming from consistency across the many 
compliance frameworks to which each enterprise is likely to be subject.
74
 
4.3 Deficiencies of the new regime 
4.3.1 Uncertain application and administration 
However, while the policy goals noted above are highly justifiable, the practical 
ramifications for users are unclear and could in fact potentially significantly increase 
the compliance burden for taxpayers.  This increase in compliance costs may 
negatively impact upon Australia’s competitiveness.  Under the new rules the ATO 
appears to have much broader reconstruction powers and as it is not yet clear how 
these will be exercised, thus creating much uncertainty. 
In April 2014  the ATO released draft ruling TR 2014/D3 on the Commissioner’s view 
of the application of s 815-130 of the ITAA 1997 which includes the new power to 
reconstruct the actual transaction.  However despite this draft guidance many 
uncertainties in the practical application of this power remain and some of these 
uncertainties are discussed in the ensuing sections of the paper. 
Interestingly in June 2014 the Inspector General of Taxation released a report, Review 
into the Australian Taxation Office’s management of transfer pricing matters.
75
  The 
catalyst for this was concerns raised by various stakeholders including taxpayers, 
practitioners and professional bodies that there were unnecessary costs, protracted 
timeframes and insufficient communication by the ATO regarding areas of concern, 
consultation, guidelines and advice.  Also, a key underpinning was that the ATO 
lacked capability to deal with these complex matters. 
                                                          
73 The Hon. David Bradbury MP  ‘Reforms to Crack Down on Tax Avoidance and Profit Shifting’, 
(Media Release, 010, 13 February 2013), 
<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2013/010.htm&pageID=003&m
in=djba&Year=&DocType=>. 
74 Taxation Institute of Australia, Exposure Draft—Modernising Australia’s Transfer Pricing Rules (21 
December 2012). 
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4.3.2 Increased documentation requirements 
As noted above, the documentation requirements are significantly increased under the 
new rules, which coincide with the self-executing nature of these provisions.  While 
preparation of such documentation or maintaining these standards is not mandatory, 
failure to do so will impact on the availability for entities to advocate they have a 
reasonably arguable position (RAP).  Public officers have to sign off on the 
appropriateness of the transfer pricing position adopted.  This is particularly onerous 
given the notorious difficulties and divergent opinions that arise in determining 
comparability especially where specialised transactions or intangible assets are 
involved.  In certain circumstances a public officer may be subject to penalties for 
inaccuracies and to ensure certainty taxpayers may need to seek several opinions. This 




 argue that some of the questions arising include: will 
documentation that is prepared and stored overseas be sufficient and what degree on 
contemporaneity does the documentation need to have?  For example, does it need to 
be prepared before the return is lodged? 
The Bills Digest
77 also notes that one of the reactions to the introduction of the 
amending Bill which introduced these changes was the onerous record-keeping 
requirements with no carve out for small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  This issue 
was again raised in the Inspector General’s Report
78 
where it was noted that taxpayer’s 
compliance costs were increased by responding to ATO queries regarding transfer 
pricing.  It was noted this particularly impacts small medium entities.  As a result of 
these findings the ATO had agreed to a number of recommendations aimed at 
decreasing compliance burdens for SME taxpayers included the increased use of safe 




4.3.3 A multi-faceted hypothetical inquiry 
The new rules create a much more onerous burden on public officers as they 
necessitate looking at the overall commerciality and pricing of a particular transaction.  
Taxpayers need to determine if a transfer pricing benefit has arisen as a result of the 
transaction being subject to non-arm’s length circumstances.  This is different to the 
former inquiry that looked at arm’s length consideration.  In this context, Cain argues 
that: 
The most controversial aspect of the new legislation is the requirement to 
hypothesise arm’s length conditions, which may involve speculation about 
the broader terms and conditions independent parties may have agreed.  This 
potentially empowers the ATO to ‘reconstruct’ related party transactions, in 
                                                          
76 Sue Williamson, Ada Lam, Keir Cornish, Amita Pradhan and Zong Aw, “New Tax Avoidance and 
Profit Shifting Laws—Uncertainty for Taxpayers” Taxchat, (9 July 2013), 
<http://www.taxchat.com.au/?p=1722>). 
77 Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), above n 3, 13. 








certain circumstances, replacing the actual conditions with the ‘arm’s length 
conditions’.80 
Cain also notes that this further aligns these provisions with the GAAR and may be 
indicative of why the new transfer pricing provisions were introduced in the same Bill 
as the GAAR: 
The approach to transfer pricing is now very much aligned with an anti-
avoidance mindset and language.  Taxpayers must now be able to 
demonstrate they have considered and documented the overall commercial 
context of their cross border arrangements and concluded their behaviour is 
consistent with the way independent parties would have behaved.  This 
process can be complex. 
Entities need to ensure that the new provisions have been applied accurately in 
calculating their taxable income, which includes making adjustments for transfer 
pricing benefits.  The quid pro quo is that where penalties are levied as a result of 
transfer pricing the public officer may be personally liable for this and prosecuted 
where a false or misleading statement has been made.81 
Arguably, this may be too great a burden to impose on many public officers who may 
not be in a position to ascertain the level of detail needed.  It may necessitate asking 
such questions as: what conditions actually operate between this entity and another 
entity?  Do these differ from an arm’s length condition?  This difficulty is 
consolidated by the amorphous nature of an arm’s length condition or price. 
Given the conditions in the legislation in order to satisfy their obligations public 
officers will have to enter into an inquiry regarding the alternative postulate, similar to 
the inquiry that is necessary under Part IVA of the ITAA 1936.  For example, they 
will need to satisfy themselves with the commercial conditions between independent 
parties in the same or similar circumstances.  It is unclear what needs to be done if 
they would have structured things differently.  Does this mean that the entire 
transaction must be notionally treated as if it was supplanted with these new 
requirements?  What if there is a range of transactions that the arm’s length parties 
may have entered into or if they simply chose to do nothing?  A multitude of factors 
could influence what an arm’s length dealing would look like.  As Williamson and 
Lam state: 
This means that intercompany pricing might need to be based on 
hypothetical transactions that did not exist.  This may include alternative 
terms that could significantly impact the appropriate pricing of such 
transactions.  These provisions give the Commissioner wide ranging powers 
to effectively ‘second guess’ transactions that taxpayers have entered into, 
rather than pricing the actual transactions that took place.82 
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The necessity to prepare for the counterfactual appears to be incredibly onerous and 
difficult and would require considerable time and resources to be spent by public 
officers, which would add to compliance costs and the complexity of the current rules. 
4.3.4 Retrospective v prospective application 
One particularly contentious aspect of Division 815-A of the ITAA 1997 is that it 
applied retrospectively from 1 July 2004.  However, transitional rules provided that 
penalties for schemes in income years before 1 July 2012 were limited to the amount 
that could be substantiated under the existing provisions prior to Subdivision 815-A.  
The reasons cited for the fact that these rules were enacted retrospectively was that the 
amendments merely represented a clarification of the longstanding legislative intent 
that the law operated in this way. 
The retrospective nature of the interim measures was highly controversial.  However, 
the High Court has confirmed that the parliament can pass retrospective legislation, 
but should justify the need to do so and ensure that it does not impede a person’s 
rights.83 
Despite there being a basis in law for retrospective legislation, are obvious issues with 
retrospectivity in terms of challenges to the rule of law, certainty and overall stability 
in the tax system which can impact upon business confidence.
84
 
By contrast, the current transfer pricing rules in Australia are prospective.  While 
prospective application has an obvious attraction in terms of the rule of law and 
certainty, it also means that these new and arguably more effective provisions cannot 
apply to previous aggressive tax planning structures that may be identified.  This may 
be contrary to the public interest and protection of the revenue base.  In this regard, the 
Bills Digest states: 
There is a significant public interest reason for allowing the Commissioner 
to re-examine past transfer pricing transactions under the proposed 
arrangements.  The above example of Starbuck’s conduct in the UK is an 
alleged example of the unacceptable abuse of that countries corporate tax 
arrangement, together with the provisions applying in other countries.  It is 
safe to argue that these provisions were used in a manner far beyond the 
intention of the United Kingdom (UK) Parliament.  Should such examples 
exist in Australia then it would be in the public interest for the 
Commissioner for Taxation to re-examine such cases using the proposed 
provisions.  For where such cases exist Australia’s tax laws at the time were 
similarly abused, though their legal form may have been adhered to.85 
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Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501. 
84 For the issues associated with retrospective legislation, see the Hon. David Bradbury MP, –‘Tax 
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85 Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), above n 3, 6ff. 
 
 




Overall, the authors believe that in the absence of some egregious abuse of an existing 
tax law, remedial legislation should, as far as possible, be prospective. 
4.3.5 Time limits 
Another interesting aspect of the current legislation is that time limits that have now 
been imposed on the Commissioner’s ability to amend assessments as per the transfer 
pricing provisions.  Under the new law the amendment period is seven years whereas 
by contrast under former Division 815-A there was an unlimited period.  Whether or 
not this is a welcome development depends on the perspective adopted.  
On the one hand it does create significant further certainty for taxpayers, however, it is 
still not aligned with the general amendment period of four years for the 
Commissioner to amend an assessment.
86
 On the other hand it limits the 
Commissioner’s ability to amend assessments that may be subject to this type of 
aggressive tax planning.  As identified in the Discussion Paper on the Review of 
Unlimited Amendment Periods,
87 
the imposition of a time limit involves a very fine 
balancing act between two competing policy objectives.  Taxpayers need certainty in 
relation to their taxation affairs particularly in the self-assessment context however the 
ATO needs sufficient time to complete its verification procedures, audits and 
investigations.  As the Discussion Paper states: 
So, while short amendment periods provide greater certainty for taxpayers, 
setting periods too short may jeopardise the capacity of the Commissioner to 




The Report specifically recommended an eight year amendment period in transfer 
pricing case.  However, a seven year time period was ultimately adopted. 
The Bills Digest states that one of the main submissions made the objection that seven 
years was too long and a four year period was preferable.
89
  It was noted that an 
extension of time is available to the Commissioner under section 170(7) of the ITAA 
1936, although this is only achievable through a Federal Court order which is 
expensive and onerous to obtain. 
4.3.6 Self-assessment v Commissioner’s assessment 
Whereas former Divisions 13 and 815-A required an assessment by the Commissioner 
to trigger the operation of the transfer pricing provisions, the new provisions are self-
executing.  This means taxpayers must undertake a review of their transfer pricing 
position before completing their income tax return. 
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One of the issues associated with the provisions being self-executing is that they may 
catch many arrangements that are not within the scope of the mischief.  The advantage 
of the alternative method where the Commissioner had to exercise discretion was that 
this allowed him to weigh up all relevant facts to decide whether to ultimately pursue 
a matter. 
This considerable onus now being placed on the taxpayer may see a greater move by 
multinational entities to secure advanced consent (before entering into the transaction) 
from the revenue authority in the form of a vehicle such as an Advance Pricing 
Agreement
90 
with the Commissioner.  
4.3.7 Pricing-based v Profits-based assessments 
Australia’s current transfer pricing legislation has shifted focus from looking at the 
pricing of the transactions to an overall allocation of profits.  The implications of this 
subtle change are likely to be profound. 
In this regard, Hearder states that profits based approach may result in the 
Commissioner second guessing business decisions rather than focusing on factors 
influencing pricing.  Specifically Hearder states: 
The line might be blurred as a matter of practice, meaning that the 
Commissioner could be second-guessing business decisions, even if that was 
not the intention, rather than focusing solely on those factors influencing 
pricing.  It might also mean that the Commissioner could too readily 
reconstruct a transaction and ignore the actual transaction, based on his 
conclusions about what independent parties would have done.
91
 
This apparent intervention in the business dealings of multinational entities is a 
considerable departure from Tooheys v DCT; Sydney Ferries
92 
where it was reinforced 
that is not for the tax office to say how a taxpayer should run their business: 
The question is what he did in fact spend on his business.  If he chooses to 
employ a hundred men where 20 would have been ample that is his own 
affair. (emphasis added) 
4.3.8 Multilateral v unilateral action 
A bigger question that arises from the reform of Australia’s transfer pricing system is 
whether this type of unilateral action can be effective in combatting what is a 
multilateral issue.  In this regard, former Assistant Treasurer David Bradbury states:
 
 
It will be crucial that efforts to address BEPS occur on a multilateral basis.  
While there has been considerable rhetorical support for this cause by many 
key global leaders, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. 
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It is perfectly understandable for governments to focus on making their tax 
systems internationally competitive.  What is not sustainable is for national 
governments to ignore the global implications of turning a blind eye to their 
own harmful preferential regimes, especially where the interactions between 
their laws and the laws of the other nations are facilitating the rise of 
stateless income or worse still, stateless entities.
93
 
Likewise, Vann states: 
It is not enough to tackle international problems individually or sequentially, 
rather BEPS requires that the issues be tackled holistically.
94
 
With the continued onset of globalisation and rapid and continued advances in 
information communication technology, accompanied by the growth in the 
international trade in intangibles and services, it is increasingly likely that problems 
which previously could have been viewed through the lens of the Nation State now 
need a different theoretical construct, requiring the problems to be analysed on a 
global and multilateral basis. 
4.3.9 A flawed premise based on a concept that is difficult to ascertain 
A common theme of all three phases of Australia’s transfer pricing reforms is that they 
are based on a hypothecation which attempts to attribute arm’s length prices to 
dealings between different parts of (in most cases) the same entity.  Such a policy is 
arguably not grounded in sound economics.  As the Head of the Revenue Section of 
Treasury, Rob Heferan, states, attributing arm’s length pricing to a transaction ignores 
the synergistic reasons why a firm enters into such transactions: 
While the arm’s length method, if able to be applied, can highlight some 
cases of profit shifting, the economics underlying it are not strong.  For an 
economist, a firm can never be reduced to a series of arm’s length 
transactions.  As Ronald Coase argued so compellingly in ‘The Theory of 
the Firm’ in 1937, firms exist precisely because they create and capture 
value beyond what is obtainable through market based external contracts.
95
 
Similarly, Sadiq argues that as a theoretical basis the arm’s length model “fails to take 
into account the synergies arguably inherent in a multinational enterprise”.
96
 Likewise, 
not only is this theory flawed, it is also notoriously difficult to ascertain an arm’s 
length price. Again Heferan states: 
The difficulties in applying the arm’s length price is nothing new, but the 
nature of intangibles in the digital age makes it even harder and where the 
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intangible in question is unique, it simply does not exist in the market.  And 
by its very nature, intellectual property is always unique in some way.
97
 
Similarly Vann argues that: 
… the theory of the firm—that firms generate additional profits to those 
available in the market as otherwise they would not exist and hence the 
application of a market paradigm to allocate profits is likely to miscarry.  
The outcome may be allocation of profits to countries where activities occur 
(value is added) rather than where capital and asset ownership (particularly 
of intangibles) is located.
98
 
5. RELYING ON A RECONCEPTUALISED VERSION OF THE EXISTING SOURCE RULES  
The preceding analysis has argued that the current regime, while exhibiting some 
desirable aspects, also continues to present several practical difficulties for taxpayers 
and administrators and is arguably based on a flawed premise. 
Thus, while the amendments to the transfer pricing regime have taken Australia on a 
long and complex journey, it appears that if Australia continues to rely on the current 
conceptual basis for allocating transfer prices, these amendments will be far from the 
last chapter.  In fact, the amendments to Australia’s transfer pricing regime appear to 
entrench (rather than overcome) the issues associated with the 2010 OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines which are currently under review.  As Vann states: 
Although the Australian government linked its revision of the legislation on 
transfer pricing on BEPS, in fact that legislation adopts the 2010 version of 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines which have been much of the cause 
of the activity that the recent OECD draft is trying to shut down.99 
Given transfer pricing practices and BEPS are driven by the ingenuity and creativity 
of taxpayers and their advisers when combined with globalisation and constantly 
evolving technologies, a fundamental attribute of any potential solution must be 
flexibility and responsiveness to change to ensure rules remain robust and relevant in a 
dynamic business environment.  However, this adds to compliance costs and creates 
business uncertainty. 
Trying to put in place static rules to address an evolving problem will inevitably result 
in frequent amendment and a need to constantly revise the rules. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest a definitive solution to the 
mischief associated with transfer pricing, the authors advocate that greater reliance 
upon a reconceptualised version of existing source rules that uses economic presence 
as a basis for taxation warrants further research.  Furthermore, this provides a sound 
conceptual basis on which to ground the transfer pricing rules.
100
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Ascertaining the source of the income from an overall cross-border related party 
transaction could result in a more correct allocation of the profits than the current 
arm’s length basis addressed by the transfer pricing rules.  However, it is suggested 
that the existing common law sources rules may need to be modified or 
reconceptualised to take into account economic and related developments consequent 
upon globalisation and related challenges presented by developments in information 
technology. 
The approach advocated by the authors involves two steps which draws from the 
thesis of Pinto and related literature on source-based taxation.
101
 
First, the source of the income from the related party transaction would need to be 
ascertained.  In this regard, the idea of an economic presence instead of relying on 
formalistic rules like physical presence which are easily manipulated in an economic 
environment) or economic footprint could be used to identify the true source of such 
profits, rather than concepts like a permanent establishment or fixed base which are 
easily manipulated.  Notably, the new transfer pricing reporting standards that are to 
be implemented in Australia would assist in ascertaining the economic footprint of a 
multinational by providing an overall picture of the global operations of the entity. 
It is argued that tracing or establishing the economic presence of a company in a 
particular jurisdiction would allow a more accurate identification of the place of where 
the value is created or the profits should be allocated. 
This approach takes a substance over form approach to determining the source of 
income. Pinto
102
 notes that economic presence could be determined by reference to a 
‘regular and systematic direction of activities in a country’.  Pinto’s work refers in turn 
to Harris where he states: 
Did the taxpayer ‘purposefully avail’ itself of the benefits of a taxing state?  
Did the taxpayers conduct and operations in the taxing State rise to a level 
where it should have reasonably anticipated being hauled into court?  Were 
the taxpayers in-state activities a continuous and systematic part of its 
general business in the state.103 
Once the source of the income is ascertained, on the basis of economic presence the 
second step would be looking at the overall profits of the jurisdiction and attributing 
them to that particular jurisdiction based on the source. 
This type of approach would achieve greater flexibility and durability to truly consider 
the place where the source of profits is derived and would be more adaptable to 
changing economic circumstances.  Interestingly, in the G20 Declaration in September 
the Heads of Government stated: ‘Profits should be taxed where economic activities 
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deriving the profits are performed and where value is created.’
104
  This supports the 
proposition advocated in this paper that it is the source of the profits which one should 
endeavour to locate rather than an artificial allocation based on arm’s length prices. 
The authors concede that utilisation of the source rules may lead to less certain or 
predictable results than a more mechanistic specific anti-avoidance rule like the arm’s 
length rules adopted by the current transfer pricing regime but would better reflect the 
economic creation of profits to determine taxing rights. 
As a related point it could also be argued that the need to refer to alternative postulates 
and difficult concepts to ascertain such as an arm’s length price is already entrenching 
significant legislative uncertainty that is based on a flawed premise.  Conversely, the 
source rules are based on the correct premise that taxing rights should be attributed 
based on the source of the profits, which in the case of digitised industries, e-
commerce or related party dealings may most accurately be reflected by where the 
entities’ economic presence lies. 
In this way, source rules that are based on economic presence have the advantage of 
being more readily adaptable to the business model or method of transaction that is 
under scrutiny.  For example, where a cross-border transaction involves e-commerce 
the most important variable to consider may be where the customers are located rather 
than searching for a fixed place of business. 
In terms of re-conceptualising how this might operate, the starting point in relation to 
ascertaining source is the seminal statement of Isaacs J in Nathan v FCT
105
 that the 
source of a transaction is ‘a practical hard matter of fact’ and involves looking at what 
a “practical man would regard as a real source of income”.  Notably, the term source is 
not defined in the ITAA 1936 and is defined in a very circular manner in the ITAA 
1997 to refer to the fact that income will have an Australian source if it is ‘derived 
from an Australian’ source. 
By looking for the source of the transaction between related parties rather than trying 
to attribute an arm’s length price between related entities, it will allow a more ‘in 
substance approach’ to help to circumvent any artificial measures that seek to 
artificially shift profits, by ascertaining the location of the actual source of the 
transaction or income. For example, returning to the transfer pricing strategies, where 
a company sells goods or services in a high tax jurisdiction (for example, Australia) at 
a low price to a related company in a low tax jurisdiction and the company in the low 
tax jurisdiction on-selling them to a third party purchaser, a source-based approach 
would focus on the overall profits of the enterprise and then locate the true source of 
the transaction.  The source would depend upon the nature of the goods.  If it were 
tangible goods, the rule would look at the types of functions performed on the asset 
and if all the production occurred in Australia. If little was done to the goods in the 
low tax jurisdiction before it was on-sold to the ultimate consumer then the source 
rules would allow Australia to tax the majority of the income in the transaction. 
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In support of adopting such an approach, cases such as Cliffs International Inc v 
FCT
106 and Thorpe Nominees Pty Ltd v FCT107 illustrate a propensity by the judiciary 
in Australia to focus on a substance over form approach, with the Court inquiring 
where the economic activity that gives rise to the income has occurred.  Likewise, this 
is consistent with the ATO’s approach in Taxation Ruling TR 2013/1
108 where it is 
stated that a substance over form approach will be adopted, and in circumstances 
where there is a disconformity between the two the actual behaviour of the parties 
rather than the formal terms of the contract will be given precedence.109 
Pinto argues
110 elsewhere that source rules have continued theoretical justification for 
allocating income that arises from international transactions, even in the case of e-
commerce transactions. 
The submissions made by Pinto and others in relation to e-commerce specifically have 
broader application to related-party transfer pricing transactions.  Specifically, Pinto’s 
thesis addresses a situation where income should be said to be generated if all the 
value of what is sold is created in the country of residence (for example, where the 
intellectual property is located in a low tax jurisdiction) but the customers that 
determine this value are in the source country (where the goods are ultimately sold in 
a high tax jurisdiction).
111
 
Pinto maintains that in those cases the only contribution of the source country is the 
customers it could be argued that source countries provide marginal benefits relevant 
to the production of the income that would justify the right to tax that income in the 
first place.  However, he concedes that such an argument can be challenged on several 
policy grounds.
112
Pinto opines that even if a business doesn’t have a physical presence 
in the source country it nevertheless benefits substantially from the infrastructure in 
the source country.  Therefore, consistent with the benefit theory, it should contribute 
to the government of the source country via taxation.  Similarly, another work by 
Pinto
113 
concerns the broad nature of what can be construed as a ‘benefit’.  He states: 
Benefits that may be provided by source countries can either be general or 
specific.  In terms of general benefits, education (which relates to the 
availability and level of labour), policy, fire and defence protection represent 
obvious examples.  However, apart from these general benefits, there are 
more specific benefits that source countries may provide, including a 
conducive and operational legal infrastructure for the proper functioning of 
business.  Allied with this may be specific government policies, such as 
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keeping exchange rates stable and interest rates low, thereby providing 
economic stability and business and consumer confidence.114 
Likewise, businesses that do not maintain a physical presence derive benefits from a 
country’s legal system in ‘as much as they rely upon it to enforce payments, uphold 
intellectual property rights and maintain a pro-competitive and conducive business 
environment’.
115
  Other benefits provided from the country where the consumers are 
located include ‘waste disposal for packaging materials, consumer protection laws and 
an infrastructure upon which delivery vehicles can travel’.
116
  Pinto’s thesis refers to 
this as ‘entitlement theory’ and supports the fact that there can be taxation in source 
countries even where a business lacks a physical presence in those countries.  In fact 
Pinto states: 
Given that physical presence can be largely insignificant for an electronic 
commerce transaction, economic presence may be a better indicator upon 
which source-country tax nexus may be based.117 
Thus, in e-commerce related party transactions, it may be necessary to reconceptualise 
the source concept to focus on the economic presence of the transaction. 
It is acknowledged that ascertaining the source of each transaction could potentially be 
a difficult task and seen as practically and administratively onerous.  Furthermore, 
there may be difficulties in determining when a series of distinct transactions should 
be aggregated. 
However, these reasons for not adopting a source-based approach are as stated by 
Pinto elsewhere ‘based on practical and administrative considerations and therefore 
based on expedience rather than being founded on theoretical grounds …’
118 
 Likewise, 
in the same work Pinto acknowledges that the logistics and practicalities of 
administering a particular methodology should be a secondary condition to if it should 
be done to begin with ‘how something can be done (which involves practical and 
administrative considerations should be a secondary considerations to whether it 
should be done in the first place’.
119
 
Arguably, an approach that looks to the true source of a transaction rather than 
utilising hypothecations based on arm’s length price is much more grounded in reality 
and would be a more stable basis to allocate taxing rights.  Furthermore, the use of 
such a conceptual framework reflects to a greater extent the overall goal of the 




A reconceptualised source rule would not be based on a fiction, trying to artificially 
segregate a multinational into a series of different arm’s length transactions, so 
therefore does not exhibit the same conceptual flaw as an arm’s length price. In this 
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 that the application of arm’s length rules incorporates a ‘legal 
fiction of imagining transactions between unrelated parties’.
122
  Sadiq further states 
that this fiction fails to accord with the reality of the situation, that multinational 




Given the evolving nature of technology, the increasing mobility of labour and 
individuals consequent upon globalisation, along with the growing trade in services 
and intangibles, it is inevitable cross-border transactions will continue to rise.  
Therefore, Australia’s response to transfer pricing strategies must be flexible and 
adaptable in order to remain relevant and robust to adapt to constant change.  It will no 
longer be sufficient to use a static ‘old world approach’ to a dynamic ‘new world 
problem’. 
If sufficient flexibility can be entrenched into the transfer pricing legislation, the story 
of Australia’s legislative transfer pricing provisions may come to an end and a new 
chapter of flexible and responsive legislation may supersede it. 
Accordingly, in light of these unprecedented changes to the world economy, this paper 
has suggested a paradigm shift in approach to the allocation of taxing rights in transfer 
pricing transactions.  This shift is from ascertaining a fiction in the form of arm’s 
length price between related entities under current transfer pricing rules to adopting an 
approach grounded in reality by ascertaining the source of such profits using a 
reconceptualised notion of source-based taxation on the adoption of economic 
presence to ground a jurisdiction’s right to tax. 
While the rules may need to be reconceptualised, the ascertainment of source 
continues to have a strong theoretical underpinning and significant flexibility to deal 
with the mischief of transfer pricing in the current globalised world economy.  It is 
acknowledged that this represents a substantial change from the currently utilised 
approach.  Nevertheless, it is argued that this change in approach is necessary to deal 
with the unprecedented globalisation and continued digitisation of the world economy. 
As recently stated by Heferan these conditions have presented policy makers with the 
chance to reconsider what is an appropriate tax system and to challenge the status quo: 
… where successful thinkers are those who embrace change and 
challenge the state of play.  Globalisation and digitisation have presented 
policy advisers and policy makers with opportunities to consider what 
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